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Summary
There is general agreement that preventing 
dangerous climate change requires a funda­
mental transformation of the global economy.
Regarding carbon markets, the EU, for example,
has called for the new market-based mecha­
nism (NMM) to be established under the UN­
FCCC to “facilitate transition towards low car­
bon economy and attract further international
investment” (EU 2012). This paper discusses the 
transformative potential of the NMM and how it
should be structured to maximize transforma­
tive impact.
Transformation research generally holds that 
transformations are not linear processes as re­
sult of intentional actions of powerful actors,
but cases of interacting dynamics playing out 
on different timescales but congealing in one 
direction. They are co-evolutionary, that is, in­
volving a multitude of changes in differing so­
cio-technical (sub-)systems and take place at 
local, national and global levels. 
A variety of climate finance institutions have 
expressed the ambition to focus their support 
on actions with transformational potential and 
have developed criteria to identify such actions.
These criteria can be synthesised as follows:
 Impact beyond the project scope,
 building capacities,
 diversion of investment flows, and  
 integration into wider political and social
debates.
The negotiations on the NMM have so far not 
made much headway and its characteristics are 
hence not yet well-defined. The paper therefore 
does a case study of the EU ETS, the largest 
market-based system in existence, which shows 
that details in the arrangements of the scheme, 
such as allocation of allowances can significant­
ly influence the incentive structure of the in­
strument.  
Based on transition studies and the study of the 
EU ETS one can conclude that carbon pricing is 
necessary but is by itself not sufficient to re­
deem the various types of market failures that 
have led to the unsustainable global socio­
economic system we are deemed to change. An 
NMM should therefore be tailored to comple­
ment national policies.
As for the NMM itself, based on the discussions 
held so far, four basic options for how the NMM 
could function can be conceived:
A)  The host country government sets a sec­
toral target and implements non-trading 
policies and measures (PAMs) to reduce 
emissions.  
B)  The host country government sets a sec­
toral target and defines voluntary individual
targets for the installations within the sec­
tor. 
C)  The government sets a sectoral target and 
defines binding installation-level emission 
targets, possibly forming the basis for a na­
tional ETS. 
D) The host country government sets a sec­
toral target and installation-level targets,
but instead of issuing credits to the host 
country government the international au­
thority would issue credits directly to the 
covered installations if they beat their re­
spective installation-level crediting thresh­
olds.
Regarding the criteria for transformational po­
tential explained above, option A) provides for 
some build-up of administrative capacity in the 
host countries and provides high potential for 
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would depend on the specific set of PAMs that 
would be utilised. Options B-D would provide 
direct incentives to installation operators. They 
would also provide for strong build-up of ad­
ministrative capacity. Due to the voluntary par­
ticipation, options B) and D) would entail the 
problem of how to ensure that well-performing 
installations are rewarded even if the overall 
sectoral target is not met. Option C) would 
solve this problem by making installation-level 
targets mandatory and would thus provide the 
highest investment certainty.  
One of the motivations behind the NMM dis­
cussion is the aim to facilitate the establishment 
of domestic emission trading systems in more 
and more countries. Establishment of a domes­
tic ETS opens up further design questions, allo­
cation rules being the most problematic of de­
sign features. It may well be the case that free 
allocation mechanisms are a ‘necessary evil’ to 
be able to establish an ETS. However, an ETS 
and carbon pricing can only unfold its potential
if this ‘evil’ is overcome. The question is how
fast this change in allocation practices can prac­
tically occur. 
Especially when a sectoral ETS under an NMM 
would be directly linked to international carbon 
markets, it is in our view highly unlikely that de­
veloping countries will do without free alloca­
tion of permits to their industries quickly
enough to spur transformative change. Intro­
ducing emission trading as an NMM in a devel­
oping country, exposing the newly regulated 
industry fully to carbon price levels that reflect 
the mitigation costs and more importantly ca­
pacities to pay of developed country competi­
tors would dramatically change the terms of 
business in the NMM host country. It is there­
fore highly unlikely that any developing coun­
try would voluntarily participate in an NMM
without being able to protect their industries 
and buffering the effect of carbon pricing via 
some amount of free allocations.
A way forward could be not to open emerging 
ETSs in NMM host countries directly to interna­
tional carbon markets but instead begin with 
establishing a protected carbon market with 
full auctioning of permits but price manage­
ment in the form of e.g. a price collar. This
would allow to limit the impact on the competi­
tiveness of the domestic industry and at the 
same time meet a key precondition for the ef­
fectiveness of carbon pricing: certainty about 
future prices. The level of ambition and both 
minimum and ceiling price could gradually be 
increased to the point where it reaches the level 
of international carbon markets and linking of 
markets can be achieved without strong effects 
on the terms of trade. That is, rather than con­
verging carbon prices by linking systems with 
each other, a convergence of domestic carbon 
prices is probably needed to actually make link­
ing politically possible.
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1 Introduction  
There is general agreement that preventing 
dangerous climate change requires a funda­
mental transformation of the global economy.
For instance, the latest assessment report by 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) notes that “The stabilization of
greenhouse gas concentrations at low levels 
requires a fundamental transformation of the 
energy supply system, including the longterm
phaseout of unabated fossil fuel conversion 
technologies and their substitution by lowGHG 
alternatives”. (IPCC 2014, p. 46) 
The German Advisory Council on Global
Change similarly holds that preventing irre­
versible damages will require unprecedented 
international cooperation, new welfare con­
cepts, technological leaps, manifold institution­
al innovations and adaptable reform alliances. 
The WBGU posits that there have so far been 
only two transformations of comparable mag­
nitude in human history: the neolithical revolu­
tion, during which human societies became 
sedentary and started agriculture, and the in­
dustrial revolution (WBGU 2011).
The call for transformation has been taken up in
international climate policy. The Green Climate 
Fund (GCF) has been given the mandate to 
promote a “paradigm shift” and other interna­
tional funding mechanisms such as the British-
German NAMA Facility also demand that activi­
ties should contribute to “transformational
change” (Green Climate Fund 2014a).
Also other funding agencies have taken up 
similar commitments. But public finance, dis­
bursed through the GCF or bilaterally, will not 
suffice to provide the means for implementa­
tion at the levels required to meet the extraor­
dinary challenge ahead. Private funding will 
have to accompany these public funds in order 
to spur the necessary investments in sustaina­
ble infrastructures worldwide. Market-based 
mitigation instruments have been proposed by 
many to leverage such private sector engage­
ment (e.g. IETA 2014, Marcu 2014, Edenhofer et 
al. 2013).
A New Market-based Mechanism (NMM) was 
already defined under the UNFCCC in 2011 in
Durban (UNFCCC 2012, §83), but further discus­
sions on the issue have effectively stalled. Still, 
the NMM is to be guided by a set of criteria that 
were elaborated already one year earlier in 
Cancún (UNFCCC 2011, §80). These include in­
ter alia that the NMM should stimulate mitiga­
tion across broad segments of the economy,
safeguard environmental integrity, and ensure 
a net decrease of global greenhouse gas emis­
sions. The EU has called for the NMM to “facili­
tate transition towards low carbon economy 
and attract further international investment” 
(EU 2012).
The indicated broad scope of the NMM togeth­
er with the requirements for net decrease of 
emission and environmental integrity mandate 
that, like public funds for climate mitigation,
the modalities and procedures of the NMM in­
corporate similar provisions with regard to 
transformational change. The fundamental
questions of this policy paper therefore are:
•  What is the transformative potential of the 
NMM?
•  Can it contribute to a sustainability trans­
formation at all? 
•  How should it be structured in order to 
maximize its transformative potential? 
As basis for the discussion, the paper first syn­
thesises how transformation has been defined 
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cy initiatives (sections 2.1 and 2.2). Based on 
this synthesis the paper establishes criteria for 
how to determine transformational impact (sec­
tion 2.3). Second, the paper examines the trans­
formative potential of market-based instru­
ments on the basis of the EU ETS, so far the 
largest market-based mitigation instrument in
existence (section 3). Third, the paper takes 
stock of the current discussion on the design of 
the NMM and applies some of the insights from
the case study analysis to the case of the NMM 
(section 4). We conclude by translating these 
insights into policy recommendations for the 




























Assessing the Transformative Potential of the NMM
2 Definitions and Criteria of  
Transformation
2.1 Definitions in Transfor­
mation Literature
Studies of how transformative change, often 
also referred to as transitions, comes about 
have been a rapidly emerging field of research 
over the last decade. Transition studies concep­
tualise socio-technical systems according to the 
generic societal function they fulfil such as mo­
bility, energy provision or food production. A 
socio-technical system is further defined as “a 
configuration of elements that include technol­
ogy, policy, markets, consumer practices, infra­
structure, cultural meaning and scientific
knowledge” (Geels & Kemp, 2012, p. 49).
A transition is a long-term and co-evolutionary 
process of change where all of these elements 
mutually influence each other, ultimately 
amounting to major shifts in the overall system
configuration. As this process includes not only 
physical changes in infrastructures or organisa­
tions but also a redefinition of norms and val­
ues, new perspectives on how certain problems
are framed and eventually acted upon, a transi­
tion can be defined as a substantial shift in the 
deep and underlying structure of a system. In
successful transitions, the dynamics in different 
societal subsystems and the interactions be­
tween these subsystems are co-evolutionary 
processes which reinforce each other (Geels & 
Kemp, 2012; Grin et al., 2010; Rotmans & Loor­
bach, 2010; Shove & Walker, 2007).
To grasp the dynamic processes by which these 
types of changes unfold, transition research has 
developed a multi-level perspective (MLP). The 
MLP conceptualizes transitions as a dynamic in­
terplay of processes across three levels – land­
scape, regime, and niches – that interact and 
reinforce each other. These levels do not refer 
to specific spatial or organizational locations,
but rather to a more theoretical idea of virtual 
levels characterized by different degrees of 
structuration. Thus, a regime is understood as 
the deep structure that lies behind the stability 
and path-dependency of socio-technical sys­
tems, explaining their basic logic of functioning.
The regime level “is the rule-set or grammar 
embedded in a complex of engineering prac­
tices, production process technologies, product 
characteristics, skills and procedures, ways of
handling relevant artefacts and persons, ways 
of-defining problems; all of them embedded in
institutions and infrastructure.” (Rip and Kemp,
1998, p. 338). Regime structures are shaped by 
an exogenous landscape that embodies the 
highest degree of structuration in so far as it
cannot directly be influenced by individual
groups of actors. The lowest degree of structu­
ration can be found at the level of niches where 
new things are tried out that deviate from dom­
inant regime logics (Geels, 2011; Geels and 
Kemp, 2012; Rotmans and Loorbach, 2010).
Given the multi-dimensional nature of trans­
formational processes, it follows that structural
change processes and paradigm shifts cannot 
be completely planned and strictly steered.
However, it is possible to support transfor­
mations by increasing factors for successful
transformations, and, as a result, to help direct­
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Figure 1: Multi-level perspective on transitions. Source: Geels (2011).  
Typically, every transformative process which a 
system undergoes can be depicted as a (styl­
ised) S-curve with four phases “the pre­
development phase where the status quo sys­
tem dominates, but non-visible changes in the 
background take place; the take-off phase,
where the process of structural changes is gain­
ing momentum; the acceleration phase, where 
structural changes become visible and the sta­
bilization phase, where a new regime is estab­
lished” (Wesely et al., 2013, p. 44).
In summary, transformations are not linear pro­
cess as result of intentional actions of powerful
actors, but suites of interacting dynamics play­
ing out on different timescales but congealing 
in one direction. General characteristics of 
transformation are (WBGU, 2011):
•  Large-scale change processes are co­
evolutionary, that is, involving a multi­
tude of changes in differing socio­
technical (sub-)systems and take place 
at local, national and global levels. 
•  They include both the development of 
(niche) innovations as well as their se­
lection by users and societal anchoring 
through markets, regulations, infra­
structures and new societal norms.
•  They are influenced by large numbers 
of actors from politics, science, busi­
ness, civil society and individuals.
•  They are ultimately radical processes 
regarding their impacts and reach, but 
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Figure 2: Phase model curve and intervention types. Source: Mersmann and Wehnert (2014). 
 
2.2 Definitions in Climate Policy 
A variety of climate finance institutions have 
expressed the ambition to focus their support 
on actions with transformational potential. This
section summarises the definitions these insti­
tutions have employed. 
2.2.1 Green Climate Fund 
The Green Climate Fund has been given the 
mandate to promote a “paradigm shift” and has 
subsequently elaborated the following criteria
to determine the paradigm shift potential of
proposed projects (Green Climate Fund, 2014a):
•  Potential for scaling up and replication 
and its overall contribution to global 
low-carbon development;
•  Knowledge and learning potential;
•  Contribution to the creation of an ena­
bling environment  
•  Contribution to the regulatory frame­
work and policies 
•  Overall contribution to climate resilient
development pathways  
Further assessment criteria are mitigation and 
adaptation impact potential, sustainable devel­
opment potential, vulnerability and financing
needs of the recipients, country ownership, effi­
ciency and effectiveness (Green Climate Fund,
2014a).
Building on these general criteria, the GCF’s re­
sults management framework elaborates a log­
ic model consisting of the following levels 
(Green Climate Fund, 2014b):
1)  Paradigm shift objective
2)  Impacts at fund level
3)  Project/Programme outcomes  
4)  Project/Programme outputs  
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As for level 1), the GCF has defined the para­
digm shift objective for mitigation as a shift to 
low-emission sustainable development path­
ways. 
As for level 2) of the logic model, the GCF has 
defined the fund-level impacts for mitigation 
as:
1) Reduced emissions through increased
low-emission energy access and power
generation;
2) Reduced emissions through increased
access to low-emission transport;
3) Reduced emissions from buildings, cit­
ies and industries;
4) Reduced emissions from land use, de­
forestation, forest degradation, and
through sustainable forest manage­
ment, and conservation and enhance­
ment of forest carbon stocks.
As for level 3), the GCF has defined the follow­
ing project/programme level outcomes for mit­
igation:
1) Strengthened institutional and regula­
tory systems for low-emission planning
and development;
2) Increased number of small, medium
and large low-emission power suppli­
ers;
3) Lower energy intensity of buildings, cit­
ies, industries, and appliances;
4) Increased use of low-carbon transport;
5) Improved management of land or for­
est areas contributing to emissions re­
ductions.
The GCF has also adopted three core indicators 
for mitigation in its results management frame­
work:
1) Tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent
(tCO2eq) reduced as a result of Fund­
funded projects/programmes;
2) Cost per tCO2eq decreased for all Fund­
funded mitigation projects / pro­
grammes;
3) Volume of finance leveraged by Fund
funding, disaggregated by public and
private sources.
2.2.2 NAMA Facility 
The British-German NAMA Facility has defined
the following list of questions to assess the 
transformational potential of proposed projects 
(NAMA Facility, 2014): 
• “Is the outlined NAMA support project part
of a broader programme or policy frame­
work that contributes to achieving an ambi­
tious sectoral or national emission reduc­
tion target or implementing a low-emission
development strategy?
• Would the achievement of the emission re­
duction target or implementation of the
low-emission development strategies con­
tribute to bringing the target country onto
a low-carbon development path? Does the
outlined NAMA support project fit into a
broader context of mitigation activities in
the sector?
• Does the outlined NAMA support project
help to change the prevailing structures of
the sector that contribute to high emission
levels? Please refer to the starting situation
of the country and the sector. Does the
NAMA support project help to overcome
the systematic barriers to the reduction of
the emissions, and if so, how?
• What transformational impacts does the
outlined NAMA support project have be­
yond the scope of the project?
• Does the outlined NAMA support project
develop capacities to reduce further GHG
emissions beyond the scope of the project?
• Does the outlined NAMA support project
serve to strengthen the institutional capaci­
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example in the aid effectiveness criteria of 
the OECD/DAC? 
• Does the outlined NAMA support project
envisage the participation and/or devel­
opment of the private sector? What is the
specific contribution of the private sector to
the transformational potential?
• Does the outlined NAMA project adopt an
innovative approach to reducing emissions,
which can have impacts beyond the specific
NAMA support project (e.g. technology
transfer)?
• Is the outlined NAMA support project repli­
cable in terms of its applicability in other
regions, countries and internationally?”
2.2.3 CDKN 
The Climate and Development Knowledge 
Network (CDKN) in its policy brief “How can the 
Green Climate Fund initiate a paradigm shift?“ 
(Harmeling et al., 2013) proposes the following 
criteria: 
 “Funding decisions could be based on the 
level of ambition shown in actions towards 
a paradigm shift and the project or pro­
gramme’s comprehensiveness. An im­
portant element is the relevance of a pro­
posed action to the climate-related 
problems in that country  
 A country’s capacity to implement projects 
and its needs should both be considered 
when deciding what constitutes an ambi­
tious proposal; the latter is especially rele­
vant for the most vulnerable countries. This 
could be combined with a certain floor allo­
cation for the most vulnerable countries,
which would ensure a minimum level of 
funding for them. For example, adaptation 
finance /and to some extent for mitigation 
finance) would fund activities meeting cer­
tain key requirements, with the ambition 
element being less relevant to avoid setting 
benchmarks that might delay action.
 
 Proposals aiming towards a paradigm shift 
should include near-term benefits as well as 
long-term benefits. Another way of ensur­
ing immediate impact could be allocating a 
certain share of the available funds on a 
competitive basis, such as the extent of CO2 
reductions achieved (but taking into ac­
count inter alia the GCF’s safeguard provi­
sions).
 Embedding the funded activity into nation­
al strategies and programmes, and incentiv­
ising the dynamism of sub-national and lo­
cal actors is important for ensuring 
sustainability after the duration of the GCF­
funded project. It also allows lessons 
learned to be disseminated. Strong stake­
holder engagement processes in the identi­
fication and implementation of the pro­
posals are crucial. “ 
2.2.4 DFID 
The UK Department for International Develop­
ment funds mitigation and adaptation projects 
and programs in developing countries through 
its International Climate Fund (ICF). A total of 
nearly 4 billion GBP is to be provided to projects 
between April 2011 and March 2016 (DFID,
2014a). The ICF is seeking, just like the other ex­
amples presented, to maximize its impact by 
bringing about transformational change, e.g.
through facilitating institutional and policy 
change.
DFID has developed key performance indica­
tors (KPI) that help to assess (not measure) the 
transformative impact of its supported activi­
ties. The following account is based on these 
KPI (DFID, 2014b): 
1. “Scale: National, sectoral, regional or econ­
omy-wide programmes including institu­
tional reform and policy reform are more
likely to be transformational because of
their reach. This could include large pro­
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large scale deployment of a technology  so 
it can reach a critical deployment mass and 
so drives down its deployment costs or a 
small TA programme that works to support 
a country to reduce national fossil fuel sub­
sidies or remove a key barrier to transfor­
mational change. Projects that are particu­
larly innovative may not be required to 
meet the scale criteria.
2.  Replicable: programmes which others can 
and do copy, leading to larger-scale or far 
faster roll-out are more likely to be trans­
formative. This includes programmes which 
help cut the cost for followers – be it 
through investments in capacity and skills, 
by removing barriers through e.g. key poli­
cy change or helping drive technology 
down the learning curve.
3.  Innovative: programmes which are new and 
innovative have the potential to be trans­
formational by demonstrating and piloting 
new ways of achieving objectives that 
could lead to wider and sustained change.
These programmes are often high risk but 
with corresponding high potential returns.
4.  Leverage: programmes that leverage others 
to help increase the impact beyond the 
programme should, all things being equal,
be more likely to be transformational by un­
locking scale and replication potential. Lev­
erage could be of domestic flows from re­
cipient country, private sector or other aid 
flows – but it is important that leveraging is
additional and does not crowd out existing 
sources. It is also important to consider the 
investment/country context (risk-reward) 
for assessing the effectiveness of leverag­
ing, as the highest level is not necessarily 
the best. It could also come about by en­
couraging mainstreaming at scale (e.g. a 
small shift in WB energy lending could have 
huge impacts).
In order for a programme to be considered as 
transformational the following conditions are 
likely to prevail. These conditions are part and 
parcel of an effective development programme:
•  Sustainable: Programmes that are sustaina­
ble are more likely to have an impact after 
they have ended. However, not all piloting 
and innovation programmes will be sus­
tainable, as there is an element of experi­
mentation in the ICF – so innovative tech­
nology, for example, will only be
sustainable if successful. 
•  Political will and local ownership: Working 
with national stakeholders, including the 
powerful, who want to deliver change con­
sistent with their own political economy 
will be more effective.  
•  Increased capacity and capability to act: 
strengthening local capacity supports con­
tinued, action on climate change and lays 
the conditions for transformational change.
•  Evidence of effectiveness is credible and 
shared widely. Others are unlikely to follow 
unless they are confident of the case for 
change. This argues for substantial and 
quality M&E of key programmes, presenting 
failure alongside success. “ 
2.3 Synthesis 
The criteria used to assess the transformative 
potential of climate change mitigation instru­
ments do reflect the concepts of the scientific
transition research literature. The guidelines 
applied by the various institutions presented 
above reflect ideas such as the co-evolutionary 
nature of socio-technical transformation pro­
cesses and the need to actively shape the con­
ditions for evolutionary economics, for variation 
and selection of technologies and practices,
towards “breeding” more sustainable alterna­
tives. Sometimes this reflection is more explicit, 
















   
    
    
    
    
     
    
      
        
  
      
 
Criteria  Indicators 


















promotion of technology transfer ✓
technological learning ✓ ✓ ✓
economies of scale ✓ ✓
sustainability co-benefits ✓ ✓ ✓
Building capacities  administrative capacities ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
private sector sensitization ✓ ✓
identification for sustainable business case ✓ ✓
Diversion of investment  shift of investment patterns towards sustaina­ ✓ ✓  ✓flows ble types of production and consumption
Political integration integration with other policies into a coherent ✓ ✓ ✓policy mix
Table 1: Overview of Criteria for transformative potential of climate finance instruments. Source: Wuppertal Institute.
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The assessment criteria applied by the various 
funding institutions can be categorized into 
four main points: impact beyond the project 
scope, improving capacities, diversion of in­
vestment flows and integration into wider polit­
ical and social debates. However, the assess­
ment approaches differ in the emphasis they 
apply to these categories respectively. For a 
summary of the proposed criteria see Table 1. 
The four categories as presented below will also
guide our analysis of the transformative impact 
of various design options for a New Market 
Mechanism as discussed in chapter 4. 
2.3.1 Impact beyond the Project Scope 
Of course, a necessary condition for a mitiga­
tion instrument to be considered “transforma­
tive” is that it fulfils its prime objective, i.e. it re­
duces carbon emissions. However, this
condition is not considered sufficient. For a tru­
ly transformative impact all funding institutions 
analysed in this paper consider more multidi­
mensional impacts imperative. The NAMA Facil­
ity for example highlights a need to change 
prevailing structures, e.g. through tackling sys-
tematic barriers. Others highlight the need to 
promote the transfer of technologies between 
developed and developing countries and in­
creased deployment of low-carbon technolo­
gies thus realising a decrease of technology 
costs through learning and economies of scale 
(NAMA Facility, GCF, DFID).  
Interestingly, while a number of funders high­
light the need for “innovative policies”, the 
need for policies for innovation is not taken up.
In our view another desirable impact beyond 
the project scope would be that it spurs (private 
sector) investment in research and develop­
ment resulting in innovation of technologies 
and practices that can have positive spill-over 
effects into other parts of the (global) economy.
Last but not least, more immediate co-benefits 
for wider sustainable development objectives 
are considered as an essential complement to
the long-term transformative impact of a given 
instrument (GCF, NAMA Facility, CDKN). 
The focus on a variety of impact dimensions 
beyond pure GHG mitigation reflects the co­
evolutionary nature of socio-technical trans­


















Lukas Hermwille, Wolfgang Obergassel and Christof Arens 
not result in the type of deep restructuration of 
large parts of our societies and economies nec­
essary on the way towards sustainable and cli­
mate compatible system.
2.3.2  Building Capacities 
The built-up of capacities is highlighted by all
institutions assessed above. This reflects a need 
to realign or in some cases create administra­
tive institutions that are able to guide and gov­
ern a transition towards a more sustainable so­
cio-technical system. Programs or instruments 
with high “knowledge and learning potential”
(GCF) are therefore to be prioritized.
But the need for improved capacities is not lim­
ited to administrative capacities. To foster a sus­
tainability transformation corresponding capac­
ities are needed also in the private sector to 
sensitize business for climate change mitigation 
and adaptation as well as wider sustainable de­
velopment objectives. These capacities will be 
needed to optimize current business practices 
and to identify sustainable business models for 
the future. 
Also the idea to support innovative programs 
and policies that are replicable elsewhere (GCF, 
NAMA Facility, DFID) reflects a notion of capaci­
ty building. Testing such innovative approaches 
will increase the global portfolio of policies 
making it potentially easier to combine and se­
lect appropriate policy mixes for any given na­
tional circumstances.
The focus on such innovative approaches and 
the idea of investing in a portfolio of different 
approaches (DFID, GCF) resonates well with the 
concepts of transition management of which 
deliberate experimentation with a wide set of 
promising approaches is a core element.
2.3.3  Diversion of Investment Flows 
A successful transformation towards sustaina­
bility will require enormous investments in low­
10 
 
carbon technologies at all scales and across all
sectors of our economies. A common criterion 
across all assessed approaches is therefore the 
question whether a particular instrument does 
alter investment patterns towards more sus­
tainable types of production and consumption.
The necessary shift of investment flows cannot 
be achieved through the realignment of public
funds alone, it will also require the inclusion of 
the private sector (NAMA Facility). 
A key objective of all assessed approaches is al­
so the idea that lock-in of unsustainable tech­
nologies and/or infrastructures is to be avoided.
Especially in the power sector, energy intensive 
industries, buildings and transport investments 
are typically extremely long-lived. Investments 
in technologies and infrastructures that appear 
to provide efficiency gains in the short term 
may prevent more fundamental change in the 
long run.
To avoid this, it is necessary to create an ena­
bling environment for investments in low car­
bon technologies. In many cases this will mean 
to changing the terms of “natural selection” in
an evolutionary economics sense in favour of 
sustainable solutions. To assess the transforma­
tive potential of a mitigation instrument with 
regard to this criterion would mean to discuss 
whether or not the respective instrument can 
add to this enabling environment. 
2.3.4  Integration into Wider Political 
and Social Debates 
As noted above, one individual instrument 
cannot bring a transformation about on its 
own. It can only contribute as one element in a 
concert of efforts. If transformations are charac­
terised by the co-evolutionary nature of change 
within the various societal sub-systems, it be­
comes apparent that policy instruments devel­
oped top-down on their own cannot induce the 
required intensity of change. Most funding in­
stitutions therefore require the supported in­
struments to be embedded in a larger policy 
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package or strategy (NAMA Facility, GCF, 
CDKN). Again the idea of a portfolio of instru­
ments comes to the fore.  
The integration of a supported mitigation in­
strument is not only desirable to embrace the 
co-evolutionary nature of transformative 
change, it typically also helps to increase the 
ownership of implementing countries. The re­
quired transformational change does not come 
about in an instant but over decades. To govern 
change processes over this time scale, any in­
strument will need to rely on a strong basis of 
support to be able to send (investment) signals
credibly and tenaciously. In that sense mitiga­
tion instruments may proof to have a stronger 
transformative impact if they feature self­
sustaining properties. Creating a complement­
ing yet interdependent policy puzzle might 
thus increase the persistency of individual poli­
cies. 
To be effective in driving transformative change 
towards sustainability, Kivimaa and Kern (2014) 
argue for a balanced policy mix that entails 
both ‘motors of innovation’ – policies that aim 
to support innovation and creating niches to 
develop and mature sustainable solutions – and 
‘motors of creative destruction’ – policies that 
challenge unsustainable practice and destabi­




















Lukas Hermwille, Wolfgang Obergassel and Christof Arens 
3 Transformative Potential of  
Market-Based Instruments  
– The Case of the EU ETS  
WBGU (2011) argues that for the type of trans­
formative change necessary to avoid (perma­
nently) trespassing planetary boundaries it is
inevitable to internalise the external effects of 
carbon pollution into economic decision mak­
ing. They argue for carbon pricing as a central
building block of the regulatory framework to 
avoid dangerous climate change. Furthermore,
they have recommended that it should be the 
goal of German and European diplomatic ef­
forts to establish global emissions trading at the 
company level. A New Market Mechanism could 
be an important stepping stone towards this
end as it would offer an avenue for developing 
countries without a formal cap on their national
ghg emissions to enter the European carbon 
market and connect sectors of their economy 
with the EU ETS before eventually establishing 
their own national trading schemes. However,
WBGU (2011) also states that carbon pricing 
alone is not sufficient to redeem the various 
types of market failures that have led to the un­
sustainable global socio-economic system we 
are deemed to change. 
In this chapter we will test these claims by ana­
lysing the transformative potential of market­
based mitigation instruments, namely the EU 
ETS, taking into account the criteria synthesised 
in section 2.3 above. 
We have chosen the case of the EU ETS because 
assessing the transformative potential of hypo­
thetical policy instruments is highly speculative.
The design options for the NMM are still so
vague and low in detail that a substantive dis­
cussion is impossible. At the same time, there is 
a distinguishable trend towards the develop­
ment of new (sectoral) emissions trading 
schemes in many regions of the world (see Fig-
ure 3 below).
Most of these initiatives are modelled, at least 
to some extent, on the European Emissions 
Trading Scheme (EU ETS). The EU ETS was es­
tablished in 2003 with the adoption of the EU 
emissions trading directive and started opera­
tion in 2005. It is by far the largest and most 
comprehensive market-based mitigation policy 
in the world. Meanwhile, the EU ETS has en­
tered its third trading period and a host of ex­
periences have been made and documented.
The EU ETS is therefore a critical case to reflect 
on when discussing the transformative poten­
tial of market mechanisms.
As stated above, to assess the transformative 
potential of a policy instrument, one has to look 
beyond the instrument itself and instead look 
into wider effects into socio-technical and so­
cio-economic subsystems. The chapter is orga­
nized in accordance with the criteria spelled out
above. The assessment is carried out by review­
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3.1 Impact beyond Project 
Scope 
The scope of the EU ETS is vast. It covers nearly 
half of all ghg emissions in the European Union 
(European Commission, 2014). On the other 
hand, the stated goal is narrowly focused on 
emissions. As noted in section 2.3.1, there is a 
shared view in research and among climate fi­
nance institutions that for a truly transformative 
impact more multidimensional impacts are im­
perative. Transformations are by definition co­
evolutionary (Grin et al., 2010), i.e. change is oc­
curring in various sub-systems of the socio­
technical regime simultaneously and interde­
pendently. In this section we will therefore dis­
cuss if and how the EU ETS has affected socio­
economical practices beyond reducing emis­
sions e.g. through spurring innovation and/or 
creating environmental or social co-benefits.
First and foremost, the EU ETS has succeeded in 
achieving its prime objective, to reduce CO2 
emissions in the regulated sectors. Even includ­
ing the generous allocation of permits, the EU 
ETS drove emissions 2.5 to 5 per cent below 
business-as-usual emissions in the first trading 
period (Venmans, 2012). A positive contribution 
is generally acknowledged for the second trad­
ing period as well. However, due to the heavy 
impact of the financial and economic crisis it is
difficult to clearly and unequivocally attribute 
the drop in emissions to the ETS. Furthermore, 
an important part of emission reductions have 
been achieved outside the regulated sectors 
through the use of CDM and JI. Despite wide­
spread concerns, carbon leakage, i.e. a migra­
tion of carbon intensive industries to evade the 
regulation, leading to increased emissions out­
side the regulated area, has hardly occurred 
(Venmans, 2012).
Altogether, it can be credibly assumed that the 
ETS has substantially contributed to reducing 
ghg emissions and thus does comply with the 
necessary condition to contribute to transform­
ative change. But what has been the ETSs im­
pact beyond this central objective?  
The central idea of carbon pricing is to internal­
ise external costs of ghg emissions. If compa­
nies face direct costs for every ton of CO2 they 
emit, they will take these emissions into ac­
count in everyday decision making. Jong et al.
(2014) have found evidence that this is not only 
the case for managers who are confronted with 
the cost of carbon emissions immediately, but 
also for investors on stock markets. By correlat­
ing allowance prices with companies’ share 
prices they demonstrate that the EU ETS does 
‘bite’, i.e. that investors are sensitive to carbon 
prices and the relative carbon intensity of a firm 
is viewed as a significant factor in determining a 
company’s value. This is in fact a fundamental
change in investor behaviour that can be con­
sidered a change of prevailing structures.
The impact on innovation of low-carbon tech­
nologies and diffusion of such technologies has 
however remained below expectations. Kemp
and Pontoglio (2011) have reviewed the rele­
vant literature on technological innovation 
through environmental policy instruments.
While scholars relying on theoretical models of 
incentives typically suggest that the ETS should 
invoke increased R&D on low-carbon technolo­
gies and hence increased innovation, the em­
pirical literature by means of econometric stud­
ies, empirical case studies or surveys of firms 
finds little evidence that this is actually the case 
under the given designs. The record of current 
carbon pricing instruments is particularly poor 
when it comes to the effect on radical innova­
tions that imply a break with current compe­
tencies and technologies. Furthermore, they 
find that the adoption of innovative technolo­
gies can be influenced both positively as well as 
negatively depending on the specific arrange­
ment of the policy instrument (see also chapter 
3.3).
The contribution of the EU ETS to drive down 
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timated to be relatively low. One of the inher­
ent features of a market based instrument is 
that its steering effect is completely based on 
cost structures and its neutrality towards cer­
tain technologies. Companies are completely
free in choosing the means of mitigating the 
emission (or offsetting them). Firms will there­
fore naturally focus on those options first that 
are already proven and available at low cost.
More targeted policy instruments such as tech­
nology specific feed-in tariffs are likely to have 
contributed much more strongly to the cost di­
gression of photovoltaic and wind power expe­
rienced in recent years (Kemp & Pontoglio,
2011).
3.2 Building Capacities 
As discussed in section 2.3.2, in order to achieve 
a fundamental and ultimately transformative 
change towards a more sustainable socio­
economic system, capacities are necessary both 
in administrative institutions and the private 
sector. Public administration needs to guide 
and govern the required change and the pri­
vate sector needs to develop and maintain sus­
tainable business models. 
The EU ETS certainly has contributed to the de­
velopment of such capacities both in adminis­
tering the scheme as well as in the private sec­
tor. The increased sensitivity for carbon 
emissions through pricing as discussed above is
already an indicator of built-up of such capaci­
ties. However, many regulated companies have 
seen carbon trading primarily as a tool for com­
pliance with the regulation instead of seeing 
(speculative) emissions trading as a business on 
its own (Pinkse & Kolk, 2007). At the same time,
the EU ETS has spurred the emergence of an 
eco-system of specialized traders, information 
brokers, banks, consultants, etc. providing ser­
vices to regulated industries from the outside.
Voß and Simons (2014) go as far as describing 
this eco-system as an “instrument constituency”
as “powerful collective actors who strategically 
market their solutions, for example, by engaging 
with problem discourses, recruiting important 
supporters, or seeking to outcompete other in-
struments for a dominant position in the ‘toolbox 
of policymaking’” (Voß & Simons, 2014, p. 6).
LaBelle (2011) finds that the institutional set-up 
of the EU ETS is relatively strong as compared to 
other fields of environmental policy making 
(e.g. energy efficiency policy in the EU). He 
highlights that the EU ETS as an institution with 
strong sectoral mandate represents “a dynamic 
method of mitigating sectoral risk” (p. 401) 
through bringing together various “specialized 
stakeholders to work together to create effec­
tive solutions which mitigate risks of rolling-out
new technologies” (p. 400). His initial verdict 
therefore is that the EU ETS and the institutional 
set-up around it is well-designed to spur the 
deployment of low-carbon technologies.
3.3 Diversion of Investment 
Flows 
Ultimately, a future sustainable global economy 
will need a fundamental restructuration of 
physical infrastructures. As discussed in section 
2.3.3, a transformative policy must therefore 
contribute to a diversion of public and private 
investments into more sustainable assets and 
avoid lock-in of unsustainable infrastructures 
(Unruh, 2000).
While the ETS’s positive impact on capacities in 
the administrative and private sectors are pret­
ty much undisputed, the question is less clear 
for the ETS’s impact on investments in the regu­
lated sector. From the available literature it be­
comes apparent that in order to create the right 
investment incentive it is imperative to look in­
to the details of the ETS. The arrangement of 
allocation plans (grandfathering, benchmarking 
or auctioning) and details such as the closure 
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end of their lifetime and the provisions of the 
new entrants reserve are central for the incen­
tive structure in the ETS. 
There exists ample literature discussing the im­
plications of allocation mechanisms on the in­
centive structure. Theoretic economic models
for a long time predicted that efficiency of
emissions trading would be independent from 
the chosen allocation mode (Montgomery,
1972). However, more recent (empirical) re­
search has shown that this is not the case. Itera­
tive grandfathering, i.e. the free allocation of al­
lowances on the basis of historic emissions in
every trading period, has been proven to be 
particularly unhelpful. It can be shown that this
mode of allocation is particularly favourable for 
inefficient and highly polluting installations. If
allocations are based on historic output or per­
formance, companies have an incentive to arti­
ficially extent the lifetime of an old installation
in order not to forgo the allocation of free per­
mits that can be sold in subsequent trading pe­
riods (e.g. Neuhoff et al., 2006; Ellermann, 2008).
The flaws in the EU ETS allocation scheme be­
came apparent during the first and second trad­
ing period. Especially power producers drew in
significant windfall profits as they were able to 
pass on opportunity costs of freely allocated al­
lowances to end consumers. In response to this
the EU has revised their allocation mechanism.
In the third trading period allocation plans were 
centralised and the share of allowances to be 
auctioned substantially increased as free alloca­
tion to the power sector was completely abol­
ished (Venmans, 2012).
Despite these changes in the ETS design, there 
is little empirical evidence for the EU ETS trig­
gering substantial investments into low-carbon 
technologies. This is largely attributed to high 
price volatility in the market and overall low
carbon prices. Both are a consequence of a high 
degree of uncertainty over the stringency of EU 
climate policy in general and the ETS in particu­
lar (Venmans, 2012; Kirat & Ahmada, 2011; Fon­
tini & Pavan, 2014; Boneti et al., 2013; Jaraite & 
Di Maria, 2012; Hoffmann, 2007; Löfgren et al.,
2013).
Instead, many companies have applied a “wait­
and-see” strategy at least in the early phase of 
the ETS (Kemp & Pontoglio, 2011). Others have 
focused on short term improvements in their 
production processes through for example fuel
switch (Grubb, 2012; Kemp & Pontoglio, 2011;
Pinkse & Kolk, 2007).
To conclude, the EU ETS has contributed less 
than expected to investment in low-carbon 
technologies. In part, this was due to allocation 
mechanisms that set the wrong incentives.
However, the ETS has undergone reforms to ad-
just the incentive structure. A second reason for 
the sub-optimal performance is over-allocation 
of permits which in combination with the un­
expected effects of the European financial and 
economic crisis led to a substantial oversupply 
of allowances and hence low carbon prices, too 
low to incentivize long-term investments in
low-carbon technologies. Mending both price 
levels and allocation mechanisms, the ETS’s im­
pact on investments could probably be greatly 
improved. However, Lehman & Gawel (2013) 
argue that despite the static efficiency of the 
ETS, optimal design of the ETS (in terms of di­
version of investment flows) is impossible given 
that the ETS is politically negotiated under un­
certainty and under the premises of serving var­
ious potentially divergent political goals, such 
as security of supply, industry policy or other 
non-climate environmental benefits.
An assessment of the instrument’s transforma­
tive potential must therefore take into account 
not only an economic but also a political per­
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3.4 Integration into Wider Polit­
ical and Social Debates 
As stated above, transitions are by definition 
co-evolutionary. A single policy instrument,
even if it is designed to serve plural purposes,
can hardly enable and support change on all
required levels. Policy mixes – “set[s] of differ­
ent and complementary policy instruments to 
address a [complex] problem“ (Borras and 
Edquist, 2013, p. 1514) are particularly im­
portant to bring forward sustainability transi­
tions (Kivimaa and Kern, 2014). In this section 
we will therefore discuss to what extent the EU
ETS is an element of such a policy mix and how 
it interacts with other instruments in the mix. 
The EU ETS is part and parcel of the wider inte­
grated energy and climate package of the EU.
As such it is embedded in a wider policy pack­
age: the EU’s 20-20-20 in 2020 policy – reduc­
tion of ghg emissions of 20 per cent as com­
pared to 1990 levels, increase the share of 
renewable energy to 20 per cent and reduce 
the primary energy consumption by 20 per cent 
below business as usual through energy effi­
ciency measures. The ETS is the centre piece of 
this package and specifically targeted to ad­
dress the emission reduction component of the 
20-20-20 goal, while there are various policies 
to support the deployment of renewable ener­
gy and increase energy efficiency both at the 
EU and at the member state level.
The integrated EU energy and climate policy 
has largely been successful. The EU is on track 
to meeting its emission reduction goal. The in­
tegration of different policies into one coherent 
package has been hailed in this context. Connie 
Hedegaard, EU Climate Commissioner and re­
sponsible for the EU ETS stated in October 2013 
that “[d]uring the economic crisis we had more 
than one target and that has helped us a lot. Im-
agine if we had only had a CO2 target and the ETS 
during this crisis. Would Europe have continued to 
have such a strong focus on energy efficiency and 
renewables? I don’t believe it.” (quoted in Eurac­
tive, 2013).
There has been criticism that the price crash of 
the EU ETS has been partly due to the parallel 
implementation of policies to promote energy 
efficiency and renewables. However, the effi­
ciency and renewable energy parts of the EU 
climate and energy package were taken into 
account when the ETS cap was set (Capros et 
al., 2008). The actual scale-up of renewables has 
so far been in line with the projections made 
during the preparation of the climate and ener­
gy package. The efficiency and renewables pil­
lars of the climate and energy package can 
therefore not be blamed for the problems of 
the EU ETS (Hermann and Matthes, 2012).
Despite this track record, the future of the ETS 
as part of a wider policy package remains dis­
puted. The debate over the upcoming 2030 EU 
target was dominated to some extent by the 
question whether the EU should stick to the 
three complementary goals or whether it 
should only commit to one single ghg reduc­
tion target. While the European Parliament fa­
voured for three binding targets, parts of the 
European Commission in line with some mem­
ber states and industry groups favoured a sin­
gle target that would eventually be accompa­
nied by non-binding renewables and efficiency 
targets (Euractive, 2014).
This debate is in line with the understanding of 
several mainstream economists who argue that 
the ETS should be sufficient to achieve the cli­
mate policy objectives and any other policy will 
negatively affect the ETS’s efficiency in doing 
so. (e. g. Sinn, 2011). Others have argued that an 
integration into a policy package is in fact bene­
ficial and necessary if the emission cap of the 
ETS is not negotiated independent from the 
regulated entities and their performance but 
instead “capture” of the political process takes 
place. A policy mix may also be necessary to ac­
commodate for multivalent policy goals, in the 
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be corrected but other goals such as nuclear 
phase out or renewable energy goals as a 
means of industrial policy are also relevant 
(Gawel et al., 2014; WBGU, 2011; Löfgren et al.,
2013).
The EU ETS was established with a view to pro­
vide a long-term signal to the private sector. 
However, the recent crisis of oversupply and 
the difficult discussions with regard to an in­
creased level of ambition demonstrate how 
vulnerable the ETS as a system is to the chang­
ing political economy in the EU generally. Given 
that individual member states are effectively 
able to detain the political process of adjusting 
the system in a moment of crisis, the self sus­
taining properties of the instrument as such 
have to be considered low to inexistent. The 
fate of the only other large-scale cap-and-trade 
system that pre-dates the EU ETS, the SO2 al­
lowance trading system established in the 
United States in the 1990’s, gives a striking ex­
ample of what can happen to purely political
markets, if political support on which it is built
vanishes: After a number of court rulings and 
subsequent regulations, the SO2 allowance 
trading system effectively collapsed in 2010 
(Schmalensee and Stavins, 2012).
Also, while scholars have argued for the exist­
ence of an instrument constituency that is in­
terested in the development and continuity of 
the instrument as such (Voß & Simons, 2014),
this constituency rests itself on a much smaller 
social basis than other instruments. The Ger­
man feed-in tariffs for example are backed by 
farmers who install wind power or solar PV on 
their land, by a wide range of middle-class in­
vestors who organize themselves in renewable 
cooperatives, by local craftsmen who earn a liv­
ing in the installation of wind generators and 
PV arrays and by a local renewable energy in­
dustry. The support basis for feed-in tariffs in
Germany is arguably much broader and divers 
than that of the EU ETS (Hockenos, 2012).
3.5 The Devil is in the Detail 
Despite numerous deficits, there has been 
some transformative impact of the EU ETS and 
the deficits show that it has substantial poten­
tial to further drive transformative change con­
tributing to a wider set of policies that together 
form an effective policy mix. To summarize, the 
EU ETS:
•  has contributed to reducing emissions in
the regulated sectors;
•  has effectively contributed to developing 
administrative and private sector capacities;
•  has made managers and investors take into 
account carbon emission in everyday deci­
sion making.
However, it also 
•  has failed to provide an effective incentive 
to invest in low-carbon technologies and 
some cases may have even alimented the 
use of dated technologies causing lock-in;
•  hardly contributed to drive down costs of 
low-carbon technologies;
•  did little to foster private sector research 
and development in low-carbon technolo­
gies and thus did hardly spur innovation of 
especially more radical and potential dis­
ruptive technologies. 
However, it is also clear that the transformative 
potential of the instrument has not fully been 
realized yet. Our analysis has shown that many 
of the EU ETS’s sub-optimal performances can 
be attributed to flaws in the detailed arrange­
ments of the scheme:
•  Free allocation of permits create perverse 
incentives and can lead to lock-in of out­
dated, inefficient technologies.
•  Closure rules and rules for new entrants can 

























   
   









change of prevailing structures 
promotion of technology transfer
technological learning 




private sector sensitization 
identification for sustainable business case
shift of investment patterns towards sustainable 
types of production and consumption
integration with other policies into a
coherent policy mix










weak (due to free alloca­
tion)  
strong (but strongly con­
tested)  
Table 2: Assessment of the transformative potential of the EU ETS. Source: Wuppertal Institute.
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•  High price volatility and overall low price 
levels fail to provide a long-term incentive 
for R&D for low-carbon technologies.
•  A high degree of uncertainty induced by 
the changing political economy prohibited 
the ETS from providing a long-term signal 
for investments in low-carbon technologies.
Most of these flaws, however can be redeemed 
through adjustment in the detailed arrange­
ments of the ETS. For example, the lack of a 
long-term incentive for investment in low­
carbon technologies and the high degree of 
uncertainty can (partially) be accounted for by 
price management, e. g. through minimum 
prices or price collars (Grubb, 2012). In fact,
most of the more recently established ETSs, the 
Californian ETS, the various Chinese pilot ETSs 
as well as the prospective Korean scheme, fea­
ture some form of price management mecha­
nisms (ICAP, 2014). Even in the EU the idea of a 
minimum price has been taken up by member 
states. The UK has introduced a flexible carbon 
tax to emulate a minimum price for the regu­
lated entities under the EU ETS (Sandbag, 2012).
Distortions through free allocations and new 
entrant and closure rules have already been 
tackled to some extent by the increased use of 
auctioning in the third trading period, but may 
prove a bit more difficult to avoid altogether. 
Free allocation has been a tool to secure the 
support of wide ranges of industry in order to 
establish the ETS in the first place. And they re­
main important to accommodate concerns over 
carbon leakage for industries that are subject to 
international competition. 
Even if these flaws on the implementational
level can be dealt with, the ETS will need to be 
integrated in a wider policy mix. It can be an ef­
fective instrument that puts economic pressure 
on current unsustainable economic practices.
As such the ETS can be interpreted as a ‘motor
of creative destruction’ of unsustainable eco­
nomic practices (Kivimaa and Kern, 2014), but it 
fails to be a ‘motor of innovation’. As a technol­
ogy neutral policy it does not provide a pro­
tected space for emerging more sustainable
technologies. The EU ETS’s track record for
spurring innovation is poor. More targeted pol­
icies are necessary to complement the ETS and






All these things considered, our assessment of 
the transformative potential of the EU ETS res-
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onates well with WBGU’s verdict that pricing 
carbon – and the EU ETS plays a key role here – 
is a necessary condition for the radical trans­
formation towards sustainability required, but it 
is not sufficient to induce behavioural change 
alone given that other forms of market failure 
exist which can only be tackled by a concert of 
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4 NMM and Transformation  
4.1 What Design for the New 
Market-Based Mechanism? 
In December 2011 in Durban, the 17th Confer­
ence of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC decid­
ed to ‘define’ a NMM but did not stipulate op­
erational details (UNFCCC, 2012). COP decisions 
have so far only defined some very broad out­
lines for the NMM. The NMM is supposed to 
promote mitigation across ‘broad segments’ of 
developing country economies, may operate 
on a sectoral and/or project-specific basis, and 
is to achieve a net decrease and/or avoidance of 
GHG emissions (UNFCCC, 2013).
As the challenges of sectoral approaches are 
largely different from those of project-based 
approaches, this paper limits itself to the sec­
toral perspective. There are two basic ap­
proaches to establishing an emission market 
mechanism, the baseline-and-credit approach,
try could then undertake actions to reduce its 
emissions to the agreed level, either unilaterally 
or with some international support. If emissions 
are reduced below the target, the developing 
country would receive credits. If the target is 
not achieved, there would be no penalties. As 
illustrated in Figure 4, the maximum environ­
mental benefit of a crediting system would be 
the difference between the BAU scenario and 
the crediting baseline – or lower, if the country 















Figure 4: Environmental Benefit of Sectoral Crediting. 















could be sold 
Fixed 
Environmental Benefit 
used by the CDM and other offset mechanisms,  
and the cap-and-trade approach, used by the  
EU emissions trading system (EU ETS) and oth­
ers. In the context of developing a sector-based  
NMM these have usually been referred to as  
sectoral crediting and sectoral trading (Sterk et  
al., 2014;  see also UNFCCC, 2014).
4.1.1 Sectoral Crediting 
Sectoral crediting would be based on an agreed 
emission threshold or “no-lose target” at sec­
toral level. That is, countries would agree on a 
level of emissions for a sector. This threshold 
could be either in terms of absolute emissions 
or intensity-based, for example in terms of
emissions per unit of GDP, emissions per unit of 
electricity generated, etc. The developing coun-
Figure 5: Environmental Benefit of Sectoral Trading. 
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4.1.2 Sectoral Trading 
By contrast, sectoral trading would follow the 
cap-and-trade approach. The sectoral target 
would be a mandatory cap and the developing 
country would receive tradable units ex ante,
essentially equivalent to the assigned amount 
units (AAUs) industrialised countries receive 
under the Kyoto Protocol. If the country man­
ages to reduce its emissions below its target, it 
would thereby achieve a surplus of trading 
units which it could sell. If the country does not 
achieve the sectoral target, it would need to 
buy trading units to cover the shortfall. As illus­
trated in Figure 5, a trading system would 
therefore have a fixed environmental benefit.  
4.2 How Would the NMM Stimu­
late Mitigation Actions? 
One key feature of the existing CDM is that 
credits are issued based on the individual per­
formance of one project / one installation – irre­
spectively of the performance of all other instal­
lations in this sector. By contrast, the proposals 
for a sectoral NMM explicitly aim for a group 
performance approach: Emissions would be as­
sessed for a whole sector or group of emitters 
and trading units would be issued based on the 
performance of the whole group / sector.
Such new sectoral mechanisms may have to 
operate at the government level, at least in the 
first instance, as private entities could hardly
take responsibility for entire sectors. This would 
introduce an intermediary (the developing 
country governments) between the carbon 
market and those who actually undertake the 
investments. It would therefore be necessary 
for the developing country governments to im­
plement appropriate policies to pass the incen­
tive on to investors or those affected by the pol­
icies. 
As an alternative to governments implement­
ing policies, sectoral mechanisms may also be
devolved at the installation level. While not ex­
plicitly envisaged in the negotiation texts, not 
only sectoral trading but also sectoral crediting 
mechanisms could be broken down to the in­
stallation level. The process would be similar to 
an allocation in a cap-and-trade system, but in­
stead of allowances each installation would be 
given a crediting baseline. However, the re­
sponsibility for meeting the targets would stay 
with the host country governments. This is a 
significant difference to the current project­
based mechanisms, where the liability for pro­
ject failures lies solely at the hands of private 
project developers. New market mechanisms 
would give host governments a much more ac­
tive role in safeguarding greenhouse gas reduc­
tion achievements (Butzengeiger et al. 2012)  
On this basis, the following basic options can be 
conceived:
A)  The government sets a sectoral target and 
implements non-trading policies and 
measures to reduce emissions. These may 
be either mandatory “sticks” or voluntary 
“carrots”. This approach would thus be es­
sentially akin to Art. 17 trading under the 
Kyoto Protocol or the mechanism under the 
EU’s effort sharing decision for those sec­
tors not covered by the EU ETS. 
B)  The government sets a sectoral target and 
defines voluntary individual targets for the 
installations within the sector. If an installa­
tion beats its target, it receives credits from
the government. If not, there are no penal­
ties. 
C)  The government sets a voluntary sectoral 
baseline and defines binding installation­
level emission targets, possibly forming the 
basis for a national ETS.
The International Emissions Trading Association 
(IETA, 2010) is sceptical of such a government­
based approach. It argues that there is a strong 
risk that either governments may fail to intro­
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International handling of
Government receives credits / allowancescredits / emission units





Table 3: Options for implementation at government or installation level. Source: Wuppertal Institute.
fail to be as effective as initially projected, or
that governments may renege on their obliga­
tion to pass international credits on to the in­
vestors. They therefore propose that instead of 
going through governments sectoral crediting 
might be established with a direct relation be­
tween the installations and the international 
authority. In this version, the target would be 
set by the host country government, but in­
stead of issuing credits to the host country 
government the international authority would 
issue credits directly to the covered installations 
if they beat their respective installation-level 
crediting thresholds. The host country govern­
ment would nonetheless be responsible for en­
suring that the overall sectoral target is met 
(Option D).
These different options are summarized in the 
Table 3 above.
4.3 Transformational Potential 
of NMM Options 
A sector-based NMM would by definition go 
beyond the project scope in terms of coverage.
However, whether broad coverage would trans­
late into radical transformational impact would 
strongly depend on the implementation details
of the mechanism. As the example of the EU 
ETS has shown, even an instrument covering 
nearly half of a country’s emissions need not 
necessarily have a deep impact.
The design of the NMM is still completely open
and even the design options that have been 
proposed to date remain at a very high level of 
abstraction. Any assessment of the potential 
impact of the NMM can therefore be only a first 
approximation based on general principles. The 
following attempts to provide such an approx­
imation for the four implementation schemes 
A-D.
4.3.1 Government-Led Scheme 
In option A, the host country government re­
tains all credits/allowances that are issued and 
uses them to co-finance policy implementation. 
This option therefore directly provides for poli­
cy integration. Governments generally have a 
broad range of policy options at their disposal,
such as energy/CO2 taxation, mandatory effi­
ciency standards, renewable feed-in tariffs or 
other forms of financial support. As no trading 
units are issued to individual installations, emis­
sions could be accounted at the aggregate sec­
toral level based on statistical data such as fuel 
statistics, which reduces transaction costs (Sterk 
et al. 2014).
The reduction of transaction costs entailed by 
accounting for emissions at an aggregate level 
may facilitate the participation of countries that 
have not been able to participate in the CDM,
which has partly been caused by the substantial
installation-level MRV required under the 
mechanism. Some analysts also consider that 
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countries than trying to attract individual in­
vestment projects (Sugiyama, Yamaguchi & 
Yamagata, 2005). 
However, actual changes of prevailing struc­
tures, promotion of technology transfer and 
learning, economies of scale, sustainability 
benefits, incentives for private sector participa­
tion and diversion of investment flows would 
depend on what PAMs are implemented. Some
policies such as banning outdated technology 
can achieve very considerable emission reduc­
tions at very low transaction costs (Schneider 
and Cames, 2009). This government-led ap­
proach could also facilitate the blending of car­
bon finance from the NMM with other sources 
of domestic or international climate finance 
(Prag and Briner, 2012).
4.3.2  Voluntary Installation-Level 
Participation 
In options B and D, the government would pass 
the sectoral target on to the individual installa­
tions within the sector. Each installation would 
be assigned its own emission target. If an instal­
lation achieves its target, it receives credits. If 
not, there are no penalties.
Hence, installations would be directly exposed 
to the carbon price signal, which would pro­
mote private sector sensitisation and the identi­
fication of sustainable business models. The 
regulatory risk for investors would be much 
lower than under the CDM as there would be 
no question about eligibility, which would be 
determined top-down, and thus sectoral credit­
ing might even be able to actually drive financ­
ing decisions (Marcu, 2009). The regulatory risk 
would be especially low in option D), where in­
vestors would receive credits from the interna­
tional authority. There would thus be no policy 
risk that the host country government might 
renege on its obligation to issue credits to good 
performers. 
Due to the need to MRV installation-level emis­
sions, transaction costs would be higher than 
for option A), but by the same token there 
would be a correspondingly stronger build-up 
of administrative capacity. 
However, since target achievement would not 
be mandatory for installations, there may be 
situations where some individual installations 
successfully reduce emissions but others do not 
and thus the sector as a whole does not. There­
fore, the sector as such would not be eligible for 
credits but individual installations would be. If
installations that reduce emissions run the risk 
of not being rewarded because of the failures of 
others, the system would hardly provide an in­
centive to reduce emissions. The crediting of 
individual installations would therefore need to 
be decoupled from the performance of the sec­
tor as a whole.
The literature discusses various options (e.g.
Baron, et al. 2009; Helme et al., 2010; Marcu,
2009; Harrison et al., 2011). One option would 
be for the host country government to take on 
the risk and guarantee to provide credits to in­
stallations that reduce their own emissions re­
gardless of the overall sector performance.
However, this does not reduce the risk, it mere­
ly shifts it from the installations to the host 
country government, which may not have 
much appetite for assuming such risks, so polit­
ical feasibility of this option may be low. Anoth­
er option, which might be politically more ac­
ceptable to developing countries, would be to 
hold back a share of the credits issued to form a 
reserve. The government could also try to re­
duce the risk of sectoral non-performance by 
implementing additional policies to reduce sec­
toral emissions (that is, combining options A) 
and B) or D)). But if both government and instal­
lation operators work to reduce emissions, the 
question is who of them deserves which share 
of the credits for the overall sectoral reduction. 
Combining sector-wide target setting with vol­
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poses a major challenge for how to ensure that 
the sectoral target is actually met and that well­
performing installations are actually rewarded.
Even if one of the above options is chosen to 
ensure that sufficient credits will be available 
for well-performing installations, only installa­
tions with mitigation options at cost below the 
international carbon price would be incentiv­
ised to participate. Due to the voluntary nature 
of the system, installations with higher mitiga­
tion cost would not have to reduce their emis­
sions. The impact on prevailing structures,
technology promotion, economies of scale, and 
diversion of investment flows would hence 
probably be limited to a sub-set of the sector,
unless the international carbon price was high­
er than the cost of most mitigation options 
within the sector.  
Integration with other policies would need to 
be developed by the host country governments 
on a case by case basis. 
4.3.3  Mandatory Installation-Level 
Participation 
In option D) the installation-level targets would 
be made mandatory with penalties attached. 
These could either be financial penalties, which 
could be used by the government to purchase 
trading units if needed, or obliging the compa­
nies themselves to purchase trading units if
they have excess emissions. The government 
could also introduce a fully-fledged emissions 
trading system. Option D) would thus have all 
the advantages of options B) and D) but not 
have the problem that the overall sectoral per­
formance might not yield enough credits to re­
ward the individual good performers. This op­
tion would therefore ensure that each 
installation has an incentive to reduce emis­
sions and would thus most strongly contribute 
to private sector sensitisation (Sterk et al. 2014).
However, as the example of the EU ETS has 
shown the actual impact of such a system
would nonetheless strongly depend on the im­
plementation details.
4.3.4  Synthesis 
Table 4 provides an overview of how the four 
NMM options may be measured against the 
transformation criteria outlined in chapter 2.3.
Even though the details of the NMM have not 
been defined yet, a general level of assessment 
is still possible. Option A) provides for some
build-up of administrative capacity in the host 
countries and provides high potential for policy 
integration. However, most impacts would de­
pend on the specific set of PAMs that would be 
utilised. Options B-D would provide direct in­
centives to installation operators and would 
thus promote business sensitisation the most.
They would also provide for strong build-up of 
administrative capacity. Due to the voluntary 
participation, options B) and D) would entail
the problem of how to ensure that well­
performing installations are rewarded even if 
the overall sectoral target is not met. Option C)
would solve this problem by making installa­
tion-level targets mandatory and would thus 
provide the highest investment certainty.
However, the strength of the incentive would 
nonetheless strongly depend on further im­
plementation details. The assessment of the EU 
ETS has shown that a robust signal is needed:
the carbon price incentive only unfolds its full
effectiveness if investors can be sure that the 
price has only one direction to go: upwards.
This raises the question how certainty about fu­
ture carbon prices can be generated envisaged 
in a setting as envisaged for the NMM, where 
the carbon price would not be set domestically
as in the EU ETS but by the global balance of 
supply and demand. This very problem of insuf­
ficient global demand to pay for further emis­
sion reductions in developing countries has 
brought the CDM to a near standstill. The CDM
situation led the High-Level Panel of the CDM 
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should be some form of international reserve 
bank (CDM Policy Dialogue, 2012).
It bears noting that the above are prototypical
options, in reality one can expect a combina­
tion of option A) with one of the options B) to 
D), as there will always be some policies already 
in place and further ones are likely to be intro­
duced in parallel or later for climate- or non­
climate reasons, such as air quality. If designed 
effectively, such a hybrid of emission pricing 
and other PAMs arguably also provides the best 
prospect for maximising both environmental
effectiveness and economic efficiency.
Systems based only on emission prices can be 
expected to perform well on a short-term basis 
(static efficiency) but entail a risk that the focus 
of action is laid on short-term rather than long­
term considerations (thus neglecting dynamic 
efficiency). For example, new technologies may 
Criteria Indicators
Impact beyond change of prevailing structuresproject scope




Building capacities administrative capacities
private sector sensitization
identification for sustainable business case
Diversion of investment shift of investment patterns towards sustai
flows production and consumption
be neglected which in their infancy have high 
costs but may ultimately become the most
cost-effective option (Weber and Hey, 2012).
This is exemplified by the CDM, which has 
thousands of hydro and wind energy but only 
few solar energy projects (UNEP Risø, 2014). At 
the same time, targeted support instruments 
such as feed-in tariffs have induced strong de­
ployment and technological learning that has 
reduced equipment costs of solar photovoltaics 
by about 80% within the last five years (Lie­
breich, 2013). Effectively reducing emissions 
therefore requires a portfolio of policies tailored 




























































dependent Medium High Medium
PAM-
dependent Medium High Medium
PAM-
dependent Medium High Medium
PAM-
dependent Medium High Medium
PAM-
dependent Medium High Medium
Medium High High High
PAM-
dependent High High High
PAM-
dependent Medium High Medium
nable types of PAM-
dependent Medium High Medium
Political integration Case by case Case by case Case by caseintegration with other policies into a coherent policy mix High potential issue issue issue





















Assessing the Transformative Potential of the NMM
5 Conclusion: Potential and  
Limits for a Transformative 
NMM
This paper has sought to synthesise the find­
ings from transformation research and to elabo­
rate how these findings may be applied to the 
design of the NMM.
Transformation research generally holds that 
transformations are not linear processes as re­
sult of intentional actions of powerful actors,
but cases of interacting dynamics playing out 
on different timescales but congealing in one 
direction. General characteristics of transfor­
mation are:
• They are co-evolutionary, that is, involving
a multitude of changes in differing socio­
technical (sub-)systems and take place at
local, national and global levels.
• They include both the development of
(niche) innovations as well as their selec­
tion by users and societal anchoring
through markets, regulations, infrastruc­
tures and new societal norms.
• They are influenced by large numbers of
actors from politics, science, business, civil
society and individuals.
• They are ultimately radical processes re­
garding their impacts and reach, but may
take decades to complete.
A variety of climate finance institutions have 
expressed the ambition to focus their support 
on actions with transformational potential and 
have developed criteria to identify such actions.
These criteria can be synthesised as follows: 
 
• Impact beyond the Project Scope: For a
truly transformative impact all funding in­
stitutions analysed in this paper consider
more multidimensional impacts impera­
tive, including changes of prevailing struc­
tures, promotion of technological learning,
transfer and innovation, economies of
scale and sustainability benefits.
• Building Capacities: In order to achieve a
fundamental and ultimately transformative
change towards a more sustainable socio­
economic system, capacities are necessary
both in administrative institutions and the
private sector. Public administration needs
to guide and govern the required change
and the private sector needs to develop
and maintain sustainable business models.
• Diversion of Investment Flows: Ultimately,
a future sustainable socio-economic sys­
tem will need a fundamental restructu­
ration of physical infrastructures. A policy
with transformative potential must there­
fore contribute to a diversion of public and
private investments into more sustainable
assets and avoid lock-in of unsustainable
infrastructures.
• Integration into Wider Political and Social
Debates: As transformations are by defini­
tion co-evolutionary, a single policy in­
strument, even if it is designed to serve
plural purposes, can hardly enable and
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cy mixes are necessary to bring forward 
sustainability transitions. 
The negotiations on the NMM have so far not 
made much headway and its characteristics are 
hence not yet well-defined. Even the design op­
tions that have been proposed to date remain
at a very high level of abstraction, too abstract 
to allow for a detailed analysis. The case study 
of the EU ETS has shown that details in the ar­
rangements of the scheme – take the allocation 
of permits as an example – can significantly in­
fluence the incentive structure of the instru­
ment. Small changes in the design can make 
huge differences whether an instrument sup­
ports transformative change towards a sustain­
able socio-technical system or to the contrary 
contribute to locking in incumbent unsustaina­
ble technologies and practices even further.
Some general conclusions can nonetheless be 
drawn. The WBGU and others argue that carbon 
pricing is necessary but is by itself not sufficient 
to redeem the various types of market failures 
that have led to the unsustainable global socio­
economic system we are deemed to change.
More specifically, Kivimaa and Kern (2014) ar­
gue that a policy mix can only effectively sup­
port a sustainability transition if it covers both
aspects of creation and destruction. There is a 
need for policies that create technological
niches, that promote sustainable technologies,
that nurture innovation etc. But there is also a 
need for policies that challenge the incumbent 
regime by controlling emissions, by changing
institutional arrangements that have historically 
favoured unsustainable practices or by chang­
ing the terms of business to destabilise the in­
cumbent socio-technical regime. A major con­
clusion therefore is that an NMM need to be
integrated into a policy mix and that the mech­
anism should be tailored to complement na­
tional policies.  
As for the NMM itself, based on the discussions 
held so far, four basic options for how the NMM 
could function can be conceived:
A)  The host country government sets a sec­
toral target and implements non-trading 
policies and measures to reduce emissions.
B)  The government sets a sectoral target and 
defines voluntary individual targets for the 
installations within the sector.  
C)  The government sets a sectoral target and 
defines binding installation-level emission 
targets, possibly forming the basis for a na­
tional ETS. 
D) The host country government sets a sec­
toral target and installation-level targets,
but instead of issuing credits to the host 
country government the international au­
thority would issue credits directly to the 
covered installations if they beat their re­
spective installation-level crediting thresh­
olds.
Option A) provides for some build-up of admin­
istrative capacity in the host countries and pro­
vides high potential for policy integration.
However, most impacts would depend on the 
specific set of PAMs that would be utilised. Op­
tions B-D would provide direct incentives to in­
stallation operators and would thus promote 
business sensitisation the most. They would al­
so provide for strong build-up of administrative 
capacity. Due to the voluntary participation, op­
tions B) and D) would entail the problem of 
how to ensure that well-performing installa­
tions are rewarded even if the overall sectoral 
target is not met. Option C) would solve this 
problem by making installation-level targets 
mandatory and would thus provide the highest 
investment certainty.  
However, the strength of the incentive would 
nonetheless strongly depend on further im­
plementation details. The experience with the 
EU ETS has shown that some design features 
are particularly critical for setting transforma­
tive incentives. In particular, it has shown that a 
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tiveness if investors can be sure that the price 
has only one direction to go: upwards.
This raises the question how certainty about fu­
ture carbon prices can be generated in a setting 
as envisaged for the NMM. Not setting the car­
bon price domestically but by a function of 
global supply and demand poses a particular 
problem in this regard. Recent history demon­
strated this rather drastically: Insufficient global
demand to pay for further emission reductions 
in developing countries has brought the CDM
to a near standstill. The CDM situation led the 
High-Level Panel of the CDM Policy Dialogue to 
recommend that there should be some form of 
international reserve bank, but analysts do not 
see many options for stabilizing the market 
apart from more ambitious mitigation com­
mitments. (CDM Policy Dialogue, 2012;
Hermwille, 2013). 
One of the motivations behind the NMM dis­
cussion is the aim to facilitate the establishment 
of domestic emission trading systems in more 
and more countries. Establishment of a domes­
tic ETS opens up further design questions, allo­
cation rules being the most problematic of de­
sign features. At the same time the promise to 
provide free allocations was key to gain indus­
try support to agree on the EU ETS in the first 
place, as it is said to limit potential adverse ef­
fects on competitiveness of regulated versus 
non-regulated companies (Hepburn et al., 2006;
Egenhofer, 2007). Others have argued that in­
creased free allocation may shift political econ­
omies in a way that would allow to agree more 
stringent regulation overall (Hanoteau, 2005,
cited in Gawel et al., 2014). In fact, it may well
be the case that free allocation mechanisms are 
a ‘necessary evil’ to be able to establish an ETS. 
However, an ETS and carbon pricing can only 
unfold its potential if this ‘evil’ is overcome. The 
question is how fast this change in allocation 
practices can practically occur. The EU ETS 
changed its allocation mechanisms already af­
ter its second trading period and as a result the 
share of free allocation was strongly reduced.
However, there still exist generous exemptions 
from the general auction of permits for heavy 
industries.
Given that NMM was defined to take into ac­
count “different circumstances of developed 
and developing countries“ (UNFCCC 2012, §83)
and to ensure “voluntary participation of Par­
ties, supported by the promotion of fair and 
equitable access for all Parties” (UNFCCC, 2011,
§80a) one has to ask critically how fast this 
change can be expected to occur in a develop­
ing country participating in an NMM. Especially,
when a sectoral ETS under an NMM would be 
directly linked to international carbon markets,
it is in our view highly unlikely that developing 
countries will do without free allocation of 
permits to their industries quickly enough to 
spur transformative change.
In fact, the push to extend carbon markets to 
developing countries is driven to some extent 
by the idea that industrial production in devel­
oping countries, due to its environmental inef­
ficiency, hosts a large mitigation potential 
available at relatively low-cost. For regulated 
entities in developed countries this would pro­
vide a means to meet their obligations more 
cost-effectively (see also UNFCCC, 2012, § 83).
For developed country industries this would be 
very beneficial, but it would most likely not cre­
ate a “level playing field” for industrially com­
peting industries. Given national and interna­
tional differences in capacity to pay, a uniform 
carbon price is socially regressive. Treating dis­
similar cases alike is as inequitable as treating 
similar cases differently (Sterk and Hermwille 
2013).
Introducing emission trading as an NMM in a 
developing country, exposing the newly regu­
lated industry fully to carbon price levels that 
reflect the mitigation costs and more im­
portantly capacities to pay of developed coun­
try competitors would dramatically change the 
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agine, a country like India or China would intro­
duce a sectoral ETS with full auctioning of per­
mits and linking to the EU ETS without limita­
tions. A company in the NMM host country 
would face competing bids from European 
competitors who not only have a higher capaci­
ty to pay but also would need less allowances 
per unit of output because of their allegedly 
higher carbon efficiency. With carbon prices at 
levels that are required to incentivise invest­
ment in low-carbon technologies, this structural
disadvantage could threaten the mere exist­
ence of industries in the NMM host country. It is
therefore highly unlikely that any developing 
country would voluntarily participate in a NMM 
without being able to protect their industries 
and buffering the effect of carbon pricing via 
some amount of free allocations.
The political realities suggest that the practical
potential for transformative change of market­
based mitigation instruments, a sectoral ETS 
under a NMM scheme, has limited prospects for 
success, especially if the idea is to integrate in­
ternational carbon markets in a global carbon 
market, as long as strong differences in the lev­
el of development, consequently of capacities 
to pay and carbon efficiencies of existing indus­
trial infrastructures exist.
A way forward could be not to open emerging 
ETSs in NMM host countries directly to interna­
tional carbon markets but instead begin with 
establishing a protected carbon market with 
full auctioning of permits but price manage­
ment in the form of e.g. a price collar (Grubb,
2012). This would allow to limit the impact on 
the competitiveness of the domestic industry 
and at the same time meet a key precondition 
for the effectiveness of carbon pricing: certainty 
about future prices. 
The level of ambition and both minimum and 
ceiling price could gradually be increased to the 
point where it reaches the level of international 
carbon markets and linking of markets can be 
achieved without strong effects on the terms of 
trade. That is, rather than converging carbon 
prices by linking systems with each other, a 
convergence of domestic carbon prices is prob­
ably needed to actually make linking politically 
possible (Tuerk et al., 2009).
We therefore recommend not to rush the inte­
gration existing carbon markets with those that 
might be emerging under the NMM. Pushing 
for direct linking of ETSs could create an incen­
tive for governments in developing countries to 
rely on free allocation of permits in order to 
protect domestic industries and thus create and 
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